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The general objective of this anthology has been to discuss the 
role of non-state actors in the military supply systems in the early 
modern Swedish Realm. This includes entrepreneurial officers in 
the army, burghers in the towns, and peasants in the countryside. 
Officers are here included with non-state actors alongside burgh-
ers and peasants because during the 16th and 17th centuries they 
more closely resembled private entrepreneurs than public serv-
ants. The two main questions are: in what ways did the Swedish 
government engage civilians in supply operations, and what kind 
of special supply challenges did the northern, vast and sparsely 
populated realm have compared to other European powers?
This is not the first book to argue that civilians had an impor-
tant role to play in military supply systems. However, most of the 
studies on military history in Sweden and Finland have focused 
on wartime operations, especially on the challenges the armies 
encountered when trying to acquire the victuals or the horse 
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fodder they needed from the local population. Moreover, plenty of 
attention has been paid to conscriptions and recruitments, which 
were arguably the biggest military burdens for civil society. The 
purpose of this collection is to complement the overall picture by 
bringing to the discussion new actors, such as small-town burgh-
ers, and by also including peacetime operations to the analysis. 
In this way, the book seeks to enhance our understanding of the 
total costs and benefits of the militarisation of the early modern 
Swedish Realm.
According to Charles Tilly’s well-known theory, early modern 
governments had three ways to mobilise private resources: coer-
cion, markets or a combination of the two. As regards coercion, 
Tilly refers principally to taxation and conscriptions, but coercive 
methods were also used in actual supply operations. As shown in 
the chapters of this anthology, the Swedish crown utilised all three 
of these models, with varying effects and results.
The production of saltpetre is a good example of coercion. The 
saltpetre factories were owned by the state, but the acquisition 
of raw materials (dung, ash, firewood, straw etc.) was based on 
forced deliveries. As Mirkka Lappalainen writes in her chapter, 
the crown forced peasants to give up an important part of their 
life-saving manure to feed the endless demands of warfare. The 
oppressive nature of the system made it susceptible to insubordi-
nation, disobedience and loitering. The same conclusion applies 
to the billeting of soldiers, as the burghers did not house garrison 
soldiers because it was profitable but because it was their duty. 
According to Sofia Gustafsson, the billeting obligation was a con-
stant source of complaints and tensions in Helsinki during the 
1750s, when local burghers had to share their houses with hun-
dreds of soldiers from all over the country.
Inland, the peasants were forced to maintain bridges and roads 
for the use of the troops of the crown, as well as to provide them 
and their horses with shelter and nutrition, as Anu Lahtinen dis-
cusses in her chapter. For some of the peasants, the troop move-
ments also offered opportunities to make small profits by selling 
spirits to the soldiers, but the overall burden grew constantly at 
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the turn of the 17th century, increasing tax arrears. The crown 
also resorted to coercion-based resource mobilisation during the 
Great Northern War, when it tried to press the peasants to buy 
crown farms against their own intention, and in the early phases 
of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, when peasants and 
burghers had to bake bread for the army because there were not 
enough crown bakeries in Finland.
At first sight, the use of coercion might create an image of a 
strong state, capable of forcing its subjects to serve their ruler’s 
military ambitions. To some extent, this conception might be 
true, but there was another side to this coin. The Swedish crown 
resorted to forcing not just because of its superior administrative 
capabilities but because it did not have any other option. Towns 
were small in Finland, resources were limited, and the infrastruc-
ture was underdeveloped. It is revealing that during the Russo-
Swedish War of 1741–1743 the crown had to buy bread from the 
baker’s guild of Stockholm, as the bakers in Finland did not have 
enough ovens. Likewise, there was almost no one to sell bricks 
and lime in Finland, when the crown began to construct bakeries 
during the early phases of the campaign, and consequently the 
construction materials had to transported from Stockholm.
Both the proponents and opponents of the military revolu-
tion theory have presented the Swedish Realm as a model case of 
an effective bureaucratic state – the former treating it as a European 
norm, the latter as a European anomaly. However, as several chap-
ters in this anthology suggest, its effectiveness had its limits. The 
administration excelled in its core tasks like collecting taxes for 
the king or rounding up men for the wars but was often in trouble 
in front of more complex or unexpected missions when there was 
a lack of reliable information.
This is not to say, however, that supply markets were non-existent. 
Quite the contrary. The chapters of this book suggest that, in 
certain situations, markets had an important albeit relatively 
unexplored role in wartime and peacetime operations. The mer-
chants were often more flexible than the public administration in 
organising the supply, and also better connected to the European 
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finance markets. During the Great Northern War (1700–1721), 
the burghers of Nyen provided the army with victuals and other 
necessities, and in the spring of 1713 the supply of the army and 
navy units in Finland was practically privatised to one person, 
Johan Henrik Frisius. A single merchant – and a refugee from his 
destroyed hometown, for that matter – had better credit standing 
on international markets than the Swedish crown itself.
The Ingrian War (1609–1617) is another interesting example. 
According to Jaakko Björklund, the Swedish crown would prob-
ably have lost the campaign without the private credit offered by 
several high-ranking officers. The commanders used their per-
sonal connections and resources to pay soldiers’ salaries and to 
buy victuals and clothes for them, and they acted as necessary 
intermediaries by raising funds from the private sector to the 
ruler they served at any given time.
Some cases even indicate that Swedish decision makers, at times, 
relied too much on the possibility of utilising markets and civilian 
actors in supply. The construction period of sea fortress Sveaborg is 
a prime example of this. When the construction began in 1748, the 
army came to Helsinki with the intention of outsourcing both 
the maintenance of the construction site and the accommodation 
of the workers and soldiers to the local burghers. However, the 
burghers were too few in numbers and too afraid of the loss of their 
autonomy to take full advantage of all the possibilities, and the 
army had to resort to its own production. The soldier billeting 
system faced similar problems, as the burghers were unable to 
lodge the soldiers along the official accommodation prescripts 
and the crown had to both bend the regulations and resort to 
barrack-building.
Overall, David Parrott is probably right when arguing that the 
officers, burghers and other civilians engaged in supply operations 
extended the central government’s administrative power, and for 
that reason the outsourcing was an efficient means of mobilising 
military resources. However, the use of markets was possible only 
if there were profits to be made. Otherwise, the cooperation began 
to resemble coercion.
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The case of Nyen is illustrative in that respect. As Kasper Kepsu 
writes in his chapter, the crown had difficulties getting credit from 
wealthy merchants in Swedish cities during the Great Northern War 
because normal trade yielded a much greater profit than the 
government was able to offer. The situation was different in 
Finland, near the operational area. The small-town burghers were 
willing to do business with the army and navy, because they did 
not have better alternatives. Military operations disrupted nor-
mal trade, and consequently it was better for the merchants to use 
their connections to provision the troops than to fall into poverty.
As regards the 17th-century officers, also they were motivated 
by prospective profits. The high-ranking officers were willing to 
finance the Ingrian War from their own pockets because they 
were confident that their king would reward them sometime in 
the future – if not in money, then in land grants or high positions 
in the crown administration. Had the king not done so, he would 
have risked the loyalty of his officers. Moreover, military cam-
paigns offered always other sources of revenues than just earned 
income such as supply trade or looting. Officers who allowed their 
units to disintegrate would lose these revenues.
According to Jaakko Björklund, the Swedish crown was highly 
dependent on the services of foreign aristocrats during the Ingrian 
War. Some of them joined the war to gain experience in com-
mand, and they were not willing to use their own funding to wage 
the war. However, there were also military migrants who wanted 
to make a career in the Swedish army, and they were more eager 
to invest their own resources. These cases affirm Jan Glete’s argu-
ment that private actors preferred to cooperate with strong rulers 
capable of actually ruling their territories, although Glete did not 
develop his theory to analyse military enterprising. He was more 
interested in foreign trade and state–merchant relationships.
The Swedish kings preferred to acquire the maintenance for 
their army from civilians, either by coercion or cooperation, 
but the preconditions of their northern realm set serious limits 
on their attempts to act like their counterparts in Western and 
Central Europe. Although the privatised maintenance was in many 
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cases surprisingly effective, the crown could never fully count on 
it. The Ingrian War of 1610–1617 and the Russo-Swedish War of 
1741–1743 offer a fruitful parallel: in the former, private entrepre-
neurs turned the war into a military victory, whereas in the latter 
the lack of private entrepreneurs turned the war into a military 
disaster. This uncertainty forced the Swedish Realm to maintain 
a strong governmental machine. The stronger the state, the better 
chances it had of using private resources in military supply.
